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Why Insurance Works Better
with Some Adverse Selection
www.guythomas.org.uk
Purpose & context 
A public policy perspective on risk classification
Think about issue from viewpoint of society
(not viewpoint of insurers)
Idealistic do-gooder
Poetry not plumbing (but we need plumbing)
Thanks: Pradip Tapadar, MingJie Hao
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5Orthodox view
Restrictions on risk classification (ie anti-discrimination laws) are said to 
have the following effects:-
(1) (The few) high-risk people are more likely to buy
(2) (The many) low-risk people are less likely to buy 
(3) so the break-even price of insurance rises
(4) and the total number of people who buy insurance falls
(5) return to (1) and repeat4.
Adverse selection “spiral” ?.........
Public policy implication:
Limit adverse selection. More risk classification is always good.
6My view
Models with plausible demand elasticities suggests that markets don’t 
spiral to nothing, they stabilise
A modest degree of adverse selection is a good thing4.
4because it increases the expected population losses compensated by 
insurance (the “loss coverage”).
This happens despite higher average price and smaller number of 
people insured
Public policy implication:
Target an optimal degree of adverse selection. Some restrictions on risk 
classification (and hence some induced adverse selection) may help.
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8Toy Examples
• High and low risks covered in same proportions as in population => No adverse 
selection.
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• Higher weighted average premium, lower numbers insured
• Moderate adverse selection
• But shift in coverage towards higher risks more than offsets 
lower numbers insured => higher loss coverage.
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• Only one individual (higher risk) remains insured
• Shift in coverage towards higher risks does not offset lower 













Loss coverage is increased by the “right amount” of adverse selection 
(but reduced by “too much” adverse selection)
Outcome depends on response of each risk-group to change in price, 
i.e. demand elasticities
=> Our research agenda: look for conditions on demand elasticities 
which ensure higher loss coverage under pooling 
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Loss coverage: why it’s a useful metric
Compensation of losses is the social purpose of insurance
Loss coverage focuses on this purpose
Loss coverage puts same weight on compensation of everyone’s losses 
ex-post (no ‘favouritism’ towards higher or lower risks)4
4so more weight on coverage of higher risks ex ante
4but only in proportion  to their higher risk.
For some purposes, policymaker might want to vary the weighting 
scheme (e.g. higher/lower weight on large losses which occur at low 
frequencies) 
But loss coverage’s “equal weight on equal expected losses” (i.e. amount 
x frequency) seems an obvious place to start. 
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Loss coverage: Better than alternative metrics
Alternative 1: (unweighted) coverage
Common in public policy discussions. 
Unsatisfactory because ignores probabilities of loss. 
If coverage is concentrated over low risks, coverage can be high, 
but only small fraction of population’s losses is compensated. Bad!
Coverage =   unweighted insurance demand. 
Loss coverage =   risk-weighted insurance demand.
Alternative 2: utilitarian welfare (“social welfare”)
Sum of expected utilities. 
Common in formal economic modelling.
Unsatisfactory because utilities always unobservable. 
(But reconciled, under certain assumptions, in Hao et al. 2016a.)  
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Assume all losses and cover are unit amounts
Timeless zero-profit equilibrium
Two risk-groups, with4 
• probabilities of loss: µ1 and µ2 [say 0.01 and 0.04] 
• Population proportions: p1 and p2 [say 0.9 and 0.1]
• “fair-premium demands” : d1(µ1) = τ1 and d2(µ2) = τ2 [say 0.5 and 0.5]
Iso-elastic demand:
where λi is a positive constant.
The λi controls shape of demand curve, 
and corresponds to: 







































For an individual selected at random from the population4
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Equilibrium (cont)
Quantities to characterise the equilibrium: 
so that A = 1 is neutral, A > 1 is adverse selection.
Note: equivalent to many econometrics papers which define as                         .
where A0 denotes some reference risk classification scheme (e.g. actuarially fair premiums).
Intuition: the product QL indexes the ‘overlap’ of cover and losses.        
where  C0 denotes some reference risk classification scheme (e.g. actuarially fair premiums). 
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3. Loss coverage, C  = 
4. Loss coverage ratio   =
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Loss coverage ratio as a function of adverse selection ratio
Loss coverage is highest with an intermediate level of adverse 
selection4 
4.so we may want some restrictions on risk classification to induce 
that adverse selection.
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Loss coverage ratio as function of demand elasticity
Iso-elastic case 
Result (iso-elastic demand):
λ ⪑ 1 ⇒ LCR(λ) ⪒ 1
21
Loss coverage ratio as function of demand elasticity
Range of cases








     = −  
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Parameter n is the “elasticity of elasticity” (or “second-order elasticity”).
A negative exponential formula can represent all the patterns above:
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Convex in premium (n > 1)
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Loss coverage ratio as function of demand elasticity
Range of simple cases
4So iso-elastic demand is actually the ‘least favourable’ case.
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Loss coverage ratio as function of demand elasticity
Fully general case
For any downward-sloping demand function (possibly different for different risk-groups), 
and any number of risk-groups...
Intuition for stating a general result:
We need to say something about how each risk-group’s demand changes when the 
premium moves from the fair premium µi to the pooled premium π0.
This can be characterised by arc elasticity of demand 
− loosely, (minus) the percentage change in demand over the arc of the demand 
curve from µi to π0.



















“Weighted average of elasticity,
with weights of log(premium)”
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• if arc elasticities of lower risk-groups (those paying less than their fair premiums) 
are less than 1, and 
• arc elasticities of the higher risk-groups (those paying more than their fair premium) 
exceed those of all lower risk-groups
• then loss coverage is higher under pooling than under actuarially fair premiums.
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Yearly renewable term life insurance, 
USA
-0.4 to -0.5 Pauly et al (2003)
Term life insurance, USA -0.66 Viswanathan et al (2007)
Whole life insurance, USA -0.71 to -0.92 Babbel (1985)
Health insurance, USA 0 to -0.2
Chernew et al (1997), 
Blumberg et al (2001), 
Buchmueller and Ohri (2006)
Health insurance, Australia -0.35 to -0.50 Butler (1999)
Farm crop insurance, USA -0.32 to -0.73 Goodwin (1993)
4.at least suggestive that relevant elasticities often less than 1.




Maximise loss coverage = maximise premium income
So if profit loadings ∝ premiums, not obvious my agenda is bad for 
insurers!
But in real world where profits are not zero, many actions of insurers 
appear directed at minimising loss coverage 
– e.g. policy design, small print, claims control
4So in this sense, insurers are not trying to maximise loss coverage.
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• Perhaps insurance is not a probabilistic good, but a reassurance good 
(Chapter 3). 
• Perhaps prices are only partially risk-differentiated
− e.g. banning some variables but not others (Chapter 6).  
• Perhaps restrictions on risk classification are justified by concerns other 
than maximising loss coverage 
e.g. unfairness, pre-existing disadvantage, controllability etc etc (Chapter 7).
• Perhaps adverse selection just isn’t very prevalent (Chapter 8)
• Perhaps adverse selection stories are mainly rhetorical (Chapter 9)
• Perhaps restrictions on risk classification will lead to insurers “screening” 
high and low risks e.g. by different deductibles 
− rich economics literature, but little evidence (Chapter 10)
• Perhaps adverse selection manifests via choice of larger sum insured
− But see ‘fallacy of one-shot gambler’ (Chapter 11).
4..still, loss coverage may be a useful idea for an 
insurance-focused public policymaker
Some things I’ve left out
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Summary & next steps
Some adverse selection can be good 
Stop telling policymakers (and students) it’s always bad!
Do some plumbing! 
Public policy polemics on other topics! (see epilogue)
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Uncrowded area, so initial returns on research effort potentially high
Why uncrowded? Habit, comfort, compliance → (hopes of) funding.
Some possible topics:
• Zero-sum and negative-sum risk management 
− shifting risk from institutions to individuals, or strong to weak, or more informed 
to less informed
− imposing unwanted investment and risk choices on individuals
• Price optimisation in general insurance (Thomas 2012)
• Accident compensation (no-fault schemes; discount rates)
• Big data and privacy preservation (statistical disclosure control)
• Long-term fate of capitalism : r > g (Piketty); high concentrations of wealth 
assuming equal skills & equal patience (Fernholz)
EPILOGUE
Public policy polemics: other topics
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• Pure abstraction not enough 
– for new insights, start with polemics (even if poorly justified)
– Motivated cognition helps
• Need theories to beat theories
– evidence should be enough, but in practice it isn’t
• Positive as well as normative theories
– Explaining what is, as well as what should be
• Academic accountants, lawyers have distinct critical traditions4we don’t!
– e.g. Critical Perspectives on Accounting; Accounting, Organizations and Society; 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability,
– e.g. Critical Analysis of Law; Law and Critique; Journal of Law and Society,
• Some may say “not institutional management = not actuarial science!”  I say 
“actuarial science = Yugoslavia!”.
EPILOGUE
Public policy perspectives: methods
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Probabilistic good: 
• Insurance pays out in certain future states of world
• risk-weighting of coverage appropriately reflects the heterogeneity in the 
good provided to different individuals.
Reassurance good: 
• insurance provides ataraxia (freedom from worry) in the present state
• Less clear that risk-weighting appropriately reflects individual 
heterogeneity. (OK if 4x the risk = 4x the worry...but subjective.)
Like most (all?) quantitative analysts, I view insurance as a probabilistic 
good.  
If insurance viewed as a reassurance good, then arguable that quantum is 
not necessarily linear in probability of loss. 
APPENDIX
Probabilistic goods versus reassurance goods
.
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Loss coverage in different markets 
Market 
Perceived 



























Pet insurance Low? High Laissez-faire 
FCA penalties Negative Nil 
Insurance 
banned (0%) 
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